In this article, we consider the problem of detecting software that has been pirated and modified. We analyze a variety of detection techniques that have been previously studied in the context of malware detection. For each technique, we empirically determine the detection rate as a function of the degree of modification of the original code. We show that the code must by substantially modified before we fail to reliably distinguish it, and we show that our results offer a significant improvement over previous related work. Our approach can be applied retroactively to existing software and does not require access to the source code, and hence it is both practical and effective.
INTRODUCTION
Software piracy is the unauthorized use of software, which can include redistribution of copyrighted software or installing multiple copies of licensed software (BSA, n.d.; Microsoft, n.d.) . According to a 2010 Business Software Alliance study, the commercial value of pirated software increased 14% globally in 2010 to a record total of $58.8 billion. Furthermore, it has been estimated that almost 41% of all software installed on personal computers is pirated (BSA, 2009) . Piracy drains significant revenue from the software industry that might otherwise have been spent on salaries and innovation.
Pirated software is also a threat to security (BSA, 2009 ). To defend against attacks, software developers release fixes and patches. People who use pirated or unlicensed software are unable to benefit from patches and important updates, which may decrease their security, as well as the security of other licensed users (BSA, 2009) .
The purpose of this research is to analyze techniques that can detect software that has been pirated and modified. An attacker might modify software to obtain the functionality while trying to maintain an air of legitimacy and thereby avoid copyright infringement issues (Raysman & Brown, 2006) . Ideally, we would like to force such an attacker to make major changes to the software before we cannot reliably detect it.
The techniques developed here are designed to be used as an automated first line of analysis. For example, if a company suspects their software has been illegally copied and modified, they can compare the suspected code to the original using the techniques in this article. A high score indicates that further (costly) investigation is warranted, while a low score indicates that the suspect code differs significantly from the original code; hence, further analysis would likely be a waste of resources.
Here, we consider a variety of scoring techniques, each of which only requires access to executable files-no source code is used in our analysis. This is important because we are unlikely to have the source code of the suspect software. Some of our techniques rely on assembly code, which can be extracted via disassembly, while others apply directly to the bits of the executable files.
For all of the techniques we consider, no special effort is required at the time the software is developed, so the analysis presented here can be applied retroactively to any executable. This is advantageous in comparison to watermarking schemes, which require that a mark be embedded in the executable. Although our approach has some superficial similarity to software plagiarism detection, we doubt that it would be strong in such a use-case. We analyze the software from a low level perspective with the emphasis on structural and statistical properties, whereas plagiarism detection is generally focused on higher-level semantics, stylistic issues, and control flow (Costello, Bleakley, & Aliefendic (n.d.) ; Lukashenko, Graudina, Grundspenkis, 2007) .
The techniques we consider fit loosely in the realm of software birthmark analysis (Myles & Collberg, 2004; Tamada et al., 2004) . A software birthmark is a unique characteristic inherent to the software, which can be used for identification.
The research presented here was inspired by previous work on metamorphic virus detection (Jidigam, Austin, & Stamp, n.d.; Lee, 2013; Runwal, Low, & Stamp, 2012; Shanmugam, Low, & Stamp, 2013; Wong & Stamp, 2006) . Metamorphic malware changes its internal structure at each infection while maintaining its essential function. Such malware can easily evade signature-based detection (Borello & Me, 2008) and well-designed metamorphic malware can also evade statistical-based detection (Lin & Stamp, 2011; Sridhara & Stamp, 2013) . Malware detection provides some parallels to the problem considered here, but there are also significant differences. These similarities and differences will become clear in subsequent sections.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 includes background material on metamorphic code and a discussion of each of the scoring techniques considered here. Experimental results and analysis appear in the following section 3. Finally, the last section 4 contains our conclusion and provides suggestions for future work.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we cover relevant background information. We begin with a brief overview of metamorphic code, which we use to simulate changes made to pirated code. Then we discuss each of the five scoring techniques used in this research.
Metamorphic Software
Each copy of metamorphic software has a different internal structure, but its functionality remains essentially unchanged. Malware writers make use of metamorphic techniques to evade detection by anti-virus software (Aycock, 2006; Sridhara & Stamp, 2013) . However, metamorphism also has potential security benefits, since it can increase the "genetic diversity" of software (Gao & Stamp, 2005; Stamp, 2004) .
Next, we discuss elementary code morphing techniques based on insertion, transposition, and substitution. Note that, typically, such morphing is applied at the assembly code (or bytecode) level, since morphing at the source code level does not provide sufficiently fine-grained control. Therefore, the examples given below are based on assembly code transformations.
Code Insertion
"Dead code" is code that is never executed. Inserting such code is relatively easy and is used in some malware because it can effectively defeat standard anti-virus detection strategies (Rad & Masrom, 2010) . A variant on dead code is "do nothing" code, which is executed but has no effect on the result. In either case, the inserted code can be made stealthy, that is, can be made difficult-if not impossible-to automatically detect and remove (Collberg & Thomborson, 2002) . In either case, we refer to the inserted code as garbage code. The example in Table 1 provides a simple illustration of garbage code insertion. Note that all the code between ADD and SUB is dead due to the JMP instruction.
Code Transposition
A trivial example of code transposition consists of shuffling the order of subroutines. A more general form of transposition can be attained by dividing code into "frames," then shuffling the frames and inserting JMP instructions to maintain the order of execution. Figure 1 gives a generic view of such a code permutation technique.
Instruction Substitution
An instruction or group of instructions can be replaced by equivalent instructions. Table 2 gives an elementary example of instruction substitution.
Scoring Techniques
In this section, we discuss the scoring techniques that are used in this article to detect modified code. Each of these techniques has been previously analyzed in the context of metamorphic malware detection. 
Hidden Markov Models
A hidden Markov model (HMM) is a machine learning techniques. As the name suggests, an HMM includes a Markov process. Furthermore, this Markov process is the "hidden" part of the HMM; that is, the Markov process is not directly observable. But we do have indirect information about the Markov process via a series of observations that are probabilistically related to the underlying Markov process. The utility of HMMs derives largely from the fact that there are efficient algorithms for training and scoring. HMM have been successfully applied in a wide various fields, ranging from speech recognition (Rigoll, 1994) to malware detection (Muhaya, Khan, & Xian, 2011) . We use the following notation in our discussion of HMMs [34] :
Figure 2 illustrates a generic HMM. The part above the dashed line represents the hidden part of the model. Note that the A matrix drives the (hidden) Markov process, while the B matrix contains probability distributions that relate the hidden states to the observations. The three matrices A, B and π define the HMM and hence we denote an HMM as λ = (A, B, π ). The following three problems can be solved using HMMs (Stamp, 2004) .
Problem 1: For a given model λ = (A, B, π) and a sequence of observations O, we can determine P(O|λ).
FIGURE 2 Hidden Markov model.
That is, we can score an observation sequence to determine how well it fits a given model.
Problem 2: For a given model λ = (A, B, π) and a sequence of observations O, we can determine the most likely state sequence X . That is, we can uncover the hidden part of the model.
Problem 3: For a given observation sequence O, and specific values of N and M , we can determine a model λ = (A, B, π) that best fits the model. That is, we can train a model to fit a given observation sequence.
For our purposes, we use the solution to Problem 3 to train a model based on opcode sequences extracted from the base program. Then we use the solution to Problem 1 to score an opcode sequence extracted from a suspect program to determine how well it matches the base program-a high score indicates that the suspect code is likely a modified version of the base program. Anderson (2011) analyzes an interesting graph based technique for malware detection. A simplified version of this score is analyzed in (Runwal et al., 2012) , where equally strong metamorphic malware detection results are obtained. Here, we use the approach followed in (Runwal et al.) .
Opcode Graph Similarity
For a given program, we construct the opcode graph as follows. First, we disassemble the executable file and extract the opcode sequence. Each distinct opcode corresponds to a node in the opcode graph. A directed edge is included between any two nodes that appear consecutively at least once in the opcode sequence. Then a weight is assigned to each directed edge based on digraph frequencies in the opcode sequence.
To illustrate the process of constructing this opcode graph, suppose we disassemble an exe to obtain the opcode sequence in Table 3 . Note that five distinct opcodes appear, namely, ADD, CALL, JMP, NOP, SUB and hence the opcode graph will have five nodes.
Digraph counts for the opcodes sequence in Table 3 are given in Table 4 . For example, the opcode JMP is immediately followed by the opcode SUB in two places (beginning at lines 9 and 19) and hence a count of 2 appears at the intersection of the JMP row and SUB column in Table 4 . Using the diagram frequency counts from Table 4 , we obtain the (relative) transition probabilities in Table 5 . Note that each entry in Table 4 is normalized by the sum of the entries of its corresponding row. For example JMP occurs six times while the ordered pair (JMP, SUB) occurs twice and therefore, the (JMP, SUB) entry in Table 5 contains the probability 2/6 = 1/3. The probabilities in Table 5 are used as the edge weights on the opcode graph. For example, the weight on the directed edge connecting the JMP node to the SUB node is 1/3. Figure 3 illustrates the opcode graph obtained from the sequence in Table 3 .
Let A = {a ij } be the edge weight matrix corresponding to one executable and let B = {b ij } be the edge weight matrix from another executable. Then the opcode graph similarity score is (Runwal et al., 2012) 
where N is the number of distinct opcodes in the superset of the graphs.
Simple Substitution Distance
As its name suggests, simple substitution ciphers are one of the simplest forms of encryption (Stamp, 2011) . In this cipher, plaintext symbols map one-to-one to ciphertext symbols (Dhavare, Low, & Stamp, 2013; Mathai, n.d.) . Throughout this section, we assume the plaintext is English, although the same principles apply to any symbol set.
An example of a simple substitution key is shown in Table 6 . This key corresponds to the well-known Caesar's cipher, where each ciphertext letter is obtained by shifting the plaintext letter three positions forward in the alphabet. For example, the plaintext message HELLO encrypts to KHOOR.
For a simple substitution, the number of possible plaintext keys is 26! > 2 88 , which is sufficient to make an exhaustive key search infeasible. However, the simple substitution is weak, breaking the cipher is a standard textbook exercise (Stamp, 2011) .
The naïve method of breaking a simple substitution consists of a simple hill climb. We begin by making an initial guess for the key based on the ciphertext frequency distribution, and we then compute a putative decryption using this putative key. Then the key is repeatedly modified, with a new putative decryption computed at each step-if the putative decryption improves, we update the putative key; otherwise we retain the current key. Of course, this presupposes that we have a score to determine whether the decryption has improved. For example, we could define a score based on dictionary words or any of a variety of English language statistics. However, the process is slow and tedious, primarily since we need to decrypt the ciphertext for each putative key. Jakobsen (1995) gives a fast hill climb algorithm for breaking a simple substitution. The crucial insight is that if we limit our score to digraph statistics, it is not necessary to decrypt the ciphertext when we modify the key. Next, we explain Jakobsen's algorithm in more detail and provide an example that illustrates the process. But first we note that for any automated hill climb attack on the simple substitution, we must address the following issues:
1. How to select the initial putative key? 2. How to modify the key? 3. How to compute a score?
In Jakobsen's algorithm, steps 1 and 2 are straightforward; step 3 is the clever part.
We denote a putative key as K = (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 , . . . , k 25 , k 26 ) where K is permutation of the 26 letters. Given the ciphertext C, the initial putative key K is is based on monograph statistics. That is, the most common letter in C is mapped to E, which is the most common letter in English, the second most common letter in C is mapped to the second most common letter in English, and so on. We then use this initial guess K to decrypt C and obtain a putative plaintext. This is the only time that we need to decrypt the ciphertext. Before discussing the scoring algorithm, we describe the key modification process.
Given the initial putative decryption, we conduct a hill climb, where at each step we swap elements of K following the pattern 
round 1 : k 1 |k 2 k 2 |k 3 k 3 |k 4 · · · k 23 |k 24 k 24 |k 25 k 25 |k 26 round 2 : k 1 |k 3 k 2 |k 4 k 3 |k 5 · · · k 23 |k 25 k 24 |k 26 round 3 : k 1 |k 4 k 2 |k 5 k 3 |k 6 · · · k 23 |k 26 . . . . . . . . .
round 24 : k 1 |k 24 k 2 |k 25 k 3 |k 26 round 25 : k 1 |k 25 k 2 |k 26 round 26 : k 1 |k 26 (1) where "|" denotes a swap. Also, after any swap where the score improves, we update the key and start over at the beginning of the swapping schedule in (1). Thus, the minimum number of swaps is 26 2 = 325, and the maximum number is unbounded. The average number of swaps depends on the strength of the scores, which depends on the length of the ciphertext. In Dhavare et al. (2013) , empirical evidence is given showing that the number of swaps ranges from an average of 1050 (for a ciphertext C of length 500) to 630 (for C of length 8000). Since each swap requires a score computation, this is the work factor for the algorithm. Next, we need to describe Jakobsen's scoring algorithm. Let E = {e ij } be a matrix of size 26 × 26 containing the expected digraph statistics for the English language and let D = {d ij } be tshe digraph matrix for the current putative decryption. Then the score is given by
which is simply the Manhattan (or taxicab) distance between the matrices E and D. Finally, we discuss the crucial insight that makes Jakobsen's algorithm is efficient. Recall that after the initial decryption, we swap elements of the key according to (1). If we swap elements k i and k j , then all digraph statistics in D are unaffected except those that involve row or column i or j. And, in fact, we simple need to swap rows and columns i and j of D to obtain the matrix D corresponding to the new putative key K . Instead of proving this, we illustrate the process via a simple example from (Shanmugam et al., 2013) .
Suppose we have simple substitution cipher based on the 10 letters E, T, A, O, I, N, S, R, H, D
( 3) which we have listed in descending order of expected frequency. Further, suppose we are given the ciphertext TNDEODRHISOADDRTEDOAHENSINEOARDT TDTINDDRNEDNTTTDDISRETEEEEEAA (4) The frequency counts for this ciphertext are E T A O I N S R H D 11 9 5 4 4 6 3 5 2 12 (5) Matching the ciphertext frequency counts in (5) with the expected frequencies for English in (3), we obtain the initial putative key
Using this putative key, we decrypt the ciphertext in (4) to obtain the putative plaintext:
AOETRENDSHRIEENATERIDTOHSOTRINEAAE ASOEENOTEOAAAEESHNTATTTTTII (7) From the putative decrypt in (7), we obtain the digraph distribution matrix E T A O I N S R H D E 3 1 2 1 0 3 1 1 0 0 T 2 4 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 A 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 O 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 I 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 N 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 S 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 R 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 H 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 D 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 (8) Now suppose that we perform the initial swap of elements of the key K . Then we modify the initial putative key in (6) We observe that the post-swap digraph distribution matrix in (10) is the same as the pre-swap digraph distribution matrix in (8), except that the first two rows and columns have been swapped-the boxed rows and columns in (10).
In Jakobsen's algorithm, we only modify the key by swapping elements, which has the effect of swapping the corresponding rows and columns of the digraph distribution matrix. Hence, there is no need to decrypt the ciphertext-we simply generate the new digraph distribution matrix by swapping the appropriate rows and columns, then compute the new score using (2). The process is extremely efficient since it only requires a single decryption of the putative plaintext. Note that after the initial decryption, the process itself is independent of the length of the ciphertext. However, as mentioned above, convergence is faster for longer ciphertext messages, since the statistics in the D matrix are more accurate. This is in stark contrast to the naïve attack, where the work factor grows with the length of the ciphertext. Shanmugam et al. (2013) show that Jakobsen's algorithm can provide an effective score for computing software similarity in the context of metamorphic malware detection. Shanmugam applies Jakobsen's algorithm to opcode sequences, with the expected digraph frequencies of a given metamorphic family playing the role of the "language" statistics (i.e., the E matrix). Given an executable file to score, its opcodes are extracted and the analog of the D matrix is constructed. Jakobsen's algorithm is then applied to "decrypt" the file, relative to the expected statistics in E. The score is simply the final distance calculation between D and E as given in (2). Although the opcodes are not encrypted, the obfuscation process used in certain metamorphic malware is apparently sufficiently similar to a simple substitution so that strong results are obtained for many challenging classes (Shanmugam et al.) . We apply this same process to compute a score for use in the software piracy detection problem considered in this paper.
Singular Value Decomposition
In this section, we discuss a score based on Singular Value Decomposition (SVD). Principle Component Analysis (PCA) is a linear algebraic technique that reveals the geometric structure of a matrix.
The following analogy is given in Shlens (n.d.) . Suppose that we want to explore a town in the American west. To do so, we could apply the following procedure:
1. Begin by driving on the longest street in town. 2. When we cross another long street, drive on it. 3. Continue mapped the main streets in this manner.
Employing this algorithm, it is likely that we will obtain a reasonable overview of the general layout of the town after traversing a relatively small number of streets. In PCA, the principle components correspond (roughly) to the long streets in this analogy, and the process we use to find the principle components is somewhat similar to the process of finding the longest streets (with some limitations). Below, we reference this analogy when discussing the SVD similarity score.
While there are many methods available for computing the principle components, the most popular seems to be the SVD. Recent work has shown that PCA is effective for metamorphic detection(e.g., Deshpande, Park, and Stamp, 2014) . In the context of malware detection, SVD is analyzed in Jidigam et al. (n.d.) . The mathematics involved in the PCA training phase is somewhat involved, but the actual scoring process is simple and efficient.
An in-depth treatment of PCA is beyond the scope of this article. Here, we only provide an overview, with the emphasis on SVD and its role in metamorphic detection; Jidigam et al. (n.d.) is a source for additional details on SVD in the context of malware detection.
Suppose we conduct a series of n "experiments", where we measure m quantities for each experiment. Let A m×n be a matrix whose i th column consists of the m measurements obtained for experiment i. We normalize the matrix A so that the mean of each measurement type is 0. Next, form the matrix
The matrix C is known as a covariance matrix-the diagonal elements are variances for each measurement type and the other elements are covariances. Specifically, element c ii is the variance of measurement type that appears in row i of A, while c ij , for i = j, is the covariance between the measurement types in rows i and j of A. Generally speaking, the larger the variance, the most informative the measurement type. Also, a non-zero covariance implies redundancy and the larger the covariance (in terms of absolute value), the greater the redundancy. Therefore, in the ideal case, all covariances would be 0 and consequently our idealized matrix C would be diagonal, with a few dominant elements on the diagonal. However, we do not choose the matrix C, which is based on experimental results. But, the discussion in the previous paragraph suggests that if we diagonalize the matrix C, we will reveal important structure in the data that might otherwise be non-obvious. There are several techniques available in linear algebra for diagonalizing matrices, but SVD is most popular for PCA.
Let Y be a given n × m matrix. Then the SVD decomposition of Y is given by
where S is a diagonal matrix that contains the square roots of the eigenvalues, and U contain the so-called left singular vectors of Y , and V contains the right singular vectors. The left singular vectors are defined to be the eigenvectors of YY T , while the right singular vectors are defined as the eigenvectors of Y T Y . Observe that the matrix YY T is n × n, while Y T Y is m × m. In our experiments, n is generally much smaller than m and we can take advantage of the structure of the SVD to reduce the work in the training phase by dealing with the left singular vectors; for additional details see Jidigam et al. (n.d.) .
To summarize, the SVD can be used to determine the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the covariance matrix C. In the process, we diagonalize C, with the eigenvalues appearing on the diagonal. Hence, the largest eigenvalues reveal the "most interesting" aspects (in some sense) of the data. Furthermore, the eigenvectors corresponding to the largest eigenvalues represent this interesting structure. In the analogy of exploring a new town discussed above, we could view the directions that we travel as corresponding to the eignevalues while the main roads that we traverse are the eigenvectors.
As an example of the SVD, we consider a 2-dimensional shear matrix. Such matrices have a wide variety of uses, such as converting a letter in standard font to its italic or slanted form. The SVD of such a matrix is illustrated in Figure 4 , where σ 1 and σ 2 are eigenvectors, as discussed below. This example shows that the SVD has a geometric interpretation although, in general, it is not quite as straightforward as in this example.
If we are given a vector of the appropriate dimension, we can project it onto the space defined by the important eigenvectors, that is, the eigenvectors corresponding to the dominant eigenvalues. In doing so, we obtain a score that quantifies how closely the vector aligns with the most significant structure in the covariance matrix. Perhaps surprisingly, this score computation is efficient, only requiring the computation of a small number of dot products.
To apply SVD to the problem of measuring software similarity, we proceed as follows. First, we extract the code or .text sections from n copies of a given "family." Let m be the maximum number of bytes in any of these files and pad the remaining files with 0, so that all are of length m. This set of padded files constitutes the training set. For the purposes of piracy detection, the "family" consists of slightly modified versions of the base software.
Note that in contrast to the HMM, opcode graph, and simple substitution scores discussed above, the SVD score does not require an expensive disassembly step to extract opcodes. Also, the SVD will reveal file structure, whereas the HMM, opcode graph, and simple substitution scores are based on statistical properties of the opcode sequences. Therefore, in this paper we distinguish between statistical scores (HMM, opcode graph, simple substitution) and structural scores (SVD and a compression-based score discussed below). Next, we discuss the training and scoring process in more detail. However, for the sake of brevity, we omit some details. For a more complete discussion of SVD in the context of software similarity, see Jidigam et al. (n.d.) ; for an introduction to PCA in general, there is no better source than Shlens (n.d.).
Training
1. Let V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V n be the (padded) .text sections extracted from the n family members that comprise the training set.
Form the m × n matrix
that is, V i is the i th column of A. Note that we are treating each byte value as a floating point number. 3. Apply the SVD process to determine the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the covariance matrix C = 1 n AA T . 4. Let u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u be the eigenvectors corresponding to the dominant eigenvalues of C. Note that these are obtained from the SVD calculation. 5. Project each V i in the training set onto the space spanned by the eigenvectors e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e . This is accomplished by computing
6. Finally, define the scoring matrix = [ 1 , 2 , . . . , n ].
Column i of is the weight vector corresponding to element V i in the training set.
To complete our presentation of the SVD scoring technique, we show how to use the matrix to score a given file.
Scoring
1. Let X be the .text section extracted from the file we want to score, padded with 0 so that it is of length m, if necessary. 2. Project X onto the eigenspace defined by u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u . Analogous to the training phase, we compute
3. Finally, the SVD score is given by
where d (x, y) is the Euclidean distance between x and y.
Suppose that we score X = V i for some i. That is, suppose we score the i th vector from the training set. Then we obtain an exact match with i , and hence the score is 0. On the other hand, if X differs significantly from the training set, we expect that the score will yield a (relatively) large positive value. Sorokin (2011) applies structural entropy analysis to the problem of malware detection while Baysa, Low and Stamp (2013) show that Sorokin's technique works well on a challenging class of metamorphic malware. To compute this structural entropy score, we measure entropy over a series of windows, based on raw byte values extracted from executable files. We then apply wavelet analysis to determine blocks of similar entropy, with the score based on the size and entropy of these blocks. Deng, et al. (2011) successfully applies compression analysis for malware detection. Zhou and Inge (2008) also consider compression analysis for malware detection. The work presented in Lee (2013) can be viewed as a combination of compression analysis and Sorokin's structural technique. Specifically, entropy is calculated over a series of windows, and wavelet analysis is applied to determine segments the have similar compression ratios. The actual score computation is based on the size and compression ratio of the resulting blocks. That is, Lee uses Sorokin's scoring technique, but replaces the entropy calculation with compression rate, and obtains results that are comparable to those obtained by Baysa et al. (2013) for metamorphic detection.
Compression-Based Scoring
In this article, we apply the compression-based score in Lee (2013) to the problem of software piracy detection. Note that this score is a structural score-like the SVD score discussed earlier and in contrast to the statisticalbased scores (HMM, opcode graph similarity, and simple substitution) discussed previously.
The scoring technique in Lee (2013) consists of two major phases, namely, file segmentation followed by sequence comparison. Figure 5 gives a high-level view of segmentation process. The compression series y 0 , y 1 , . . . y n consists of compression rates over a series of n overlapping sliding windows. Wavelet analysis is applied to this series to obtain m segments denoted x 0 , x 1 , . . . x m where the compression rate is relatively uniform within segment x i , yet differs significantly from its neighboring segments x i−1 and x i+1 . In Figure 5 , the compression rate of segment x i is denote r(x i ), while the size (in bytes) of segment x i is given by s(x i ).
Given the compression and size vectors obtained from two executable files, the sequence comparison phase computes a similarity score using a complex Levenshtein distance calculation. Here, we provide an overview of the score, with the emphasis on the distance calculation. For additional details, particularly on the segmentation phase, see Baysa et al. (2013) , Lee (2013) , and Sorokin (2011) .
We note in passing that this scoring technique includes many parameters. Here, we selected parameters similar to those given by Baysa et al. (2013) , most of which follow directly from Sorokin's seminal paper (2011). Additional fine tuning of some of these parameters is considered by 
FIGURE 6
Compression ratios plot (Lee, 2013). Lee (2013) . In particular, Lee (2013) provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between the window and slide size. A thorough discussion of transform techniques is beyond the scope of this article. Here, we simply illustrate the effect of the wavelet transform with an example from Lee (2013) . The graph in Figure 6 was obtained by computing compression ratios for a particular executable file, over a series of overlapping sliding windows. The goal is to split the file into contiguous segments, where the compression ratio in each segment is fairly consistent, and differs significantly from adjacent segments. The primary difficulty in dealing directly with the data in Figure 6 is the presence of a large amount of high frequency noise. That is, the rapid oscillations at small scales tends to obscure the behavior over larger scales. Transform techniques enable us to, in effect, filter out the high frequency noise, thereby making the desired segments easier to extract. Figure 7 shows the effect of a series wavelet transforms are applied to the data in Figure 6 . The filtering effect is readily apparent, and we find it much easier to automatically extract relevant segments from Figure 7, part (d) , than from the original data.
Note that if we continue the scaling process illustrated in Figure 7 , at some point we lose resolution; that is, distinct segments become indistinguishable. There are several parameters that need to be set so that we obtain sufficient noise reduction, but we do not go too far and lose resolution. As mentioned above, many of these issues are analyzed in detail in Baysa et al. (2013) , Lee (2013) , and Sorokin (2011) .
The wavelet transform analysis yields a series of compression ratios, each of which has an associated length. The length is most conveniently expressed in terms of the window size. We then use a predetermined threshold to segment the file based on high and low compression ratios.
To illustrate the segmentation process, consider the following example from Lee (2013) . Suppose that the wavelet transform yields 10 windows, with respective compression ratios of 0.82, 0.64, 0.79, 0.90, 1.00, 0.60, 0.55, 0.93, 0.88, 0.90.
Suppose that we set the high/low threshold at 0.65. Then Table 7 shows resulting file segmentation, where the segment length is given in terms of the number of windows. In this case, we have segmented the file into five segments, where segments 1, 3 and 5 are high entropy, and segment 2 and 4 are low entropy, based on our threshold of 0.65. Next we consider the process of segment comparison. At this point, we assume that we have segmented files, obtaining their corresponding length and compression results, as illustrated in (13) and Table 7 . We want to compute a similarity score for a pair of executable files, based on their segments. As in previous work (Baysa et al., 2013; Lee, 2013; Sorokin, 2011) , we use a Levenshtein (or edit) distance calculation that incorporates both the size and entropy of the segments (Wagner & Fischer, 1974) . We first illustrate a Levenshtein distance calculation for a simple case. Suppose we want to find the distance between the two string books and broom, where we allow insertion, deletion, and substitution. Further, suppose that the cost of each operation is 1. Then, for example, books → brooks (insert r) brooks → brooms (substitute k for m) brooms → broom (delete s) Below, we show that three operations is the minimum required to convert books and broom, and hence the Levenshtein distance between these two strings is three.
To generalize and systematize this distance calculation, define the cost functions
Given two sequences X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and Y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m ), we compute elements of the matrix
Then the lower-right element of D, that is, d n+1,m+1 , is the Levenshtein distance between sequences X and Y . For the books and broom example considered above, we let
for all i and j. Using the recursion in (14), we obtain the D matrix b o o k s 0 1 2 3 4 5 b 1 0 1 2 3 4 r 2 1 1 2 3 4 o 3 2 1 1 2 3 o 4 3 2 1 2 3 m 5 4 3 2 2 3 and hence the Levenshtein distance is 3, as claimed above.
We now have the tools necessary to present the compression-based score in [15] . Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n and y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m be the segments obtained from files X and Y , respectively, using the wavelet transform analysis discussed above. As above, we let r(x i ) = size of segment x i and s(x i ) = compression ration of segment x i with an analogous definition for r(y i ) and s(y i ). Then we define
and cost r (x i , y j ) = 1 1 + e −4|r(x i )−r(y j )+6.5| − 0.001501 (16) Note that the constants 6.5 and 0.001501 are the same as used in [3, 15, 32] and serve to bound cost r between 0 and 1 in the manner of a logistic function.
Using (15) and (16), the final version of the cost function is
where c s are c r are constant related to the size and compression, respectively. See Baysa et al. (2013) , Lee (2013) , and Sorokin (2011) for details. We use these functions to define a Levenshtein distance where
Again, these functions are the same as those in Baysa et al. (2013) , Lee (2013) , and Sorokin (2011). Once we have calculated edit distance using equation (14) with penalty functions (18), we calculate similarity between files X and Y using Lee (2013) :
Here, cost max is a worst case penalty that serves to bound the fraction between 0 and 1, and hence the similarity is bounded between 0 and 100. See Sorokin (2011) for the precise calculation used for cost max .
Although the score computation here is somewhat complex, the bottom line is that we obtain a similarity score for comparing two files based on compression ratios. Furthermore, the files are segmented based on compression ratios, which allows for a fine-grained analysis. This score has proved useful in the realm of metamorphic malware detection (Lee, 2013) and is a good candidate for use in the piracy detection problem considered in this article.
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Our goal is to determine the degree of morphing required to defeat each of the scoring techniques considered. In this section, we present our experimental design and results, but first we discuss our test data and the criteria used to quantify success.
Metamorphic Generator
We morph code to simulate the effect of code modifications made by an attacker who is trying to obscure the fact that he has pirated the software. We limit our morphing to dead code insertion because this is a practical and relatively straightforward technique that has been shown to be sufficient to evade several malware detection techniques (Lin & Stamp, 2011; Sridhara & Stamp, 2013) .
When inserting dead code, an attacker would generally need to insert jump instructions to maintain the functionality, as illustrated in Table 1 . In our code morphing, we mimic the actions of an attacker by inserting dead code. However, we do not insert the corresponding jump instructions. Consequently, the resulting code is unlikely to actually function properly, but it also makes the tampering more difficult to detect, since an excessive number of jump instructions would provide a strong heuristic (and statistical bias) that could be used to detect morphed code. In effect, we are assuming that the attacker can insert dead code without providing any obvious indication of having done so. This gives the attacker a significant advantage, and hence our analysis can be considered a worst-case scenario, from the perspective of detecting code tampering.
To morph a program, we begin with the target program's executable file, which is disassembled and its opcode sequence is extracted. We specify a morphing rate p and a positive integer n that indicates the number of blocks of dead code to insert. Based on p, the required amount of dead code is randomly selected from a representative set of "benign" programs and is inserted into the target program in n blocks.
For example, suppose we have a target program that contains 100 opcodes and we specify a morphing percentage of 0.4 with n = 2. Then we select 40 opcodes from benign files in the form of two blocks of 20 consecutive opcodes each. We then randomly select two locations within the target program to insert these benign opcode blocks. The result is a morphed version of the target, or base, program. The same process can be used to generate an unlimited number of morphed copies of the base program.
Again, the goal here is to simulate the actions of an attacker who pirates the code then modifies it with the primary goal to obscure the fact that the software is pirated. We believe that our morphing technique gives a clear advantage to the attacker, and hence detection rates in practice are likely to be stronger than those we report here.
Experimental Design
Our goal is to develop a practical and effective strategy for detecting software that has been pirated and modified. The scoring techniques discussed earlier appear to have some potential utility in this regard. In this section, we discuss our experimental process, which is designed to enable us to quantify the effectiveness of each score.
Given a base program, we create a training set consisting of slightly morphed copies. Specifically, we morph the base file at a rate of 5%, as in Kazi and Stamp (2013) . This serves to avoid generating models that overfit the data. We then train models for the HMM, simple substitution, and SVD scores. The opcode graph and compression scores only require direct comparison with the base program, so no training is required other than extracting and processing the relevant information from the base file.
For each experiment we need a test set consisting of modified copies of the base file, each with a precise degree of modification. We also require a representative set of other "innocent" programs. These programs will enable us to determine the effectiveness of each score at distinguishing between modified versions of the base file (which represent pirated copies) and other innocent programs (which represent suspect programs that are not pirated copies). For all experiments, we use a fixed set of innocent files consisting of the cygwin utility files listed in Table 8 . These same files were used in previous related work (Kazi & Stamp, 2013) , as well as in several metamorphic malware studies, including Baysa et al. (2013) , Deshpande et al. (2014) , Jidigam et al. (in press ), Lin and Stamp (2011) , Runwal Shanmugam et al. (2013) , Sridhara & Stamp (2013) , and Wong and Stamp (2006) . For each experiment, we specify a morphing rate and generate 100 copies of the base file, each randomly morphed at the specified rate, using the method discussed earlier. Then we score each of these 100 copies and all of the innocent programs with each of the scores considered. Our method of analyzing the resulting scores is discussed next.
ROC Curves and AUC
We use the area under the ROC curve (AUC) as our measure of success. An ROC curve is obtained by plotting the false positive rate versus the true positive rate as the threshold varies through the range of data values. An AUC of 1.0 is the ideal case, where there exists a threshold that yields no false positives or false negatives. Also, the AUC can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly selected positive instance scores higher than a randomly selected negative instance (Bradley, 1997) . Hence, an AUC of 0.5 indicates the binary classifier is no better than flipping a coin. An example scatterplot and the corresponding ROC curve are given in Figures 8(a) and 8(b) , respectively. In this case, the AUC is approximately 0.9656.
In our experiments, the morphing code used to modify the base program is extracted from benign examples of code that are unrelated to the base program. Consequently, at higher morphing rates, the modified code will tend to look less like the original base program and more like the modifying benign code. However, since we extract this morphing code from multiple, distinct sources, in some cases high morphing rates results in code that also differs from each individual file in the benign set. The scatterplots in Figure 9 illustrate this phenomenon for the opcode graph similarity score.
The point here is that in our experiments, we sometime obtain AUC values that are significantly less than 0.5, which are not meaningful. 1 For example, in Figures 9a-d , the corresponding AUC values are 0.9656, 0.9025, 0.2913, and 0, respectively. In the results below, AUC values less than 0.5 should be viewed as simply an artifact of the testing procedure we use. The significant information in our results is the degree of morphing required to drive the AUC to (approximately) 0.5.
Number of Blocks
Previous work (Kazi & Stamp, 2013) showed that for the HMM score considered here, inserting all dead code in a single block was the most effective morphing strategy, from the software pirate's perspective. We experimented with the number of blocks for the HMM score and the opcode graph similarity score-our results appear in Figure 10 . In both cases, we also find that a single block of morphed code is most effective. Hence, for all experimental results reported below, we insert morphing code in a single block.
Score Results
The AUC results for our experiments are given in Table 9 , where we use the following abbreviations: • HMM -HMM-based score.
• OGS -Opcode graph similarity score.
• SSD -Simple substitution distance score.
• SVD -SVD-based score.
• CRS -compression-ratio score.
With the exception of the HMM score, each score results in Table 9 is graphed individually in Figure 11 . All five scores are graphed on the same axis in Figure 12 .
From the results in Table 9 and Figure 12 , we see that all scores other than the HMM performed exceptionally well. The simple substitution distance, SVD, and compressionratio scores are the strongest, with morphing rates in excess of 100% required before any significant number of misclassifications are observed. The SVD score performs well at morphing rates exceeding 300%.
The HMM score is the weakest, with significant misclassifications occurring at the lowest morphing rates tested. The HMM score was included primarily to serve as a baseline for comparison with previous related work by Kazi and Stamp (2013) , where only HMM analysis is considered. Although a slightly different scoring method is used, our results for the HMM score appear to be broadly compatible with those obtained by Kazi. Consequently, the fact that our non-HMM scores significantly outperform the HMM score shows that our overall results far outperform the previous work in Kazi and Stamp. Furthermore, a combinations of the scores considered here is likely to perform significantly better.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we analyzed the effectiveness of a several software similarity scoring techniques in the context of software piracy. We assume that the pirated software is modified to avoid detection-or at least provide plausible deniability in case of suspicion. We simulated the modification process using ideas from the field of metamorphic malware detection. By extracting dead code from innocent executables and using the same set of executables as our test set, we believe we have created a near worstcase scenario from the perspective of detection. Our results demonstrate that several of the scoring techniques analyzed are highly robust, in the sense that the pirated software must be extensively modified before detection fails.
Specifically, we tested statistical scores based on Hidden Markov Models, opcode graphs, and simple substitution cryptanalysis. We also tested structural scores based on Singular Value Decomposition and compression ratios. With the exception of the HMM, all of these scores performed surprisingly well-the strongest score require more than 300% morphing of the pirated code before detection is significantly degraded. Combinations of the scores could only perform better. Since such a high rate of modification is required, it might be easier for a would-be software pirate to simply rewrite the code from scratch, rather than modify the existing code.
For future work, it would be interesting to experiment with other morphing techniques. In particular, code substitution could be more effective than the code insertion, at least with respect to some of the scores. However, code substitution would certainly be far more difficult for a software pirate to implement successfully.
Additional experiments involving other scores and combinations of various scores would be worthwhile. Scores that include dynamic analysis or otherwise measure aspects of code behavior would create a major additional hurdle for aspiring software pirates to overcome. NOTE 1. For any AUC less than 0.5, we can simply reverse the classification criteria and obtain better results.
